Letter from Zagreb: Sins of Omission by Vicary, Pierre
4 COLUMNS
LETTER
FROM
ZAGREB
Sins of Omission
There were two alternative ways in 
which the old Yugoslavia could have 
been successfully divided up. The 
first option was to accept the 1945 
borders between the six republics (in­
cluding the 1974 borders for the two 
autonomous provinces of Vojvodina 
and K osovo) and enforce them 
strongly while, at the same time, 
guaranteeing minority rights within 
those areas.
The other possibility was to throw 
out completely the old map of Yugos­
lavia and start afresh, looking at the 
populations existing in their ter­
ritory. Then, in a series of referenda, 
local populations could have been 
allowed to make their own decisions 
on where to draw the borders. This 
would have been a more complicated 
option— p articu larly  in Bosnia 
which, as we're seeing now, is almost 
impossible to divide into clear, self- 
contained ethnic zones. The crucial 
point is that whichever of these two 
options was chosen, it had to be ap­
plied consistently throughout the en­
tire territory.
A major problem with the world 
response to the Yugoslav breakup is 
that the international community has 
tended to vacillate between those 
two options. On the one hand it has 
maintained that it won't allow any 
changes of border by force. On the
other, it has left open the possibility 
of changes of border by setting up 
UN protection zones within Croatia. 
This gave Serbs in those regions 
reason to believe that they might at a 
later stage be allowed to leave 
Croatia.
The other thing for which the inter­
national community has been rightly 
criticised is its slowness to act. In 
understanding the tardiness of the 
international community's response, 
it 's  important to remember that 
Yugoslavia was part of that huge 
amorphous mass of territory until 
recently called the Eastern bloc. In 
this context, it's understandable, al­
though regrettable, that the world 
community wasn't prepared to do 
anything concrete to solve the Yugos­
lav crisis while the Soviet Union was 
still in being. Western countries were 
petrified that any decisions they took 
in Yugoslavia would be seen as 
precedents for the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. Following the coup in 
Moscow there was a clear change of 
policy on the part of the world com­
munity.
Even taking that into account, how­
ever, there have been numerous 
points at which the world com­
munity could have said 'enough'. It 
has been clear to people who live 
here that Yugoslavia has been in the 
process of disintegration for a long 
time—essentially since the death of 
Tito, but particularly since 1986-88, 
when the Communist Party began to 
lose its influence within society. It 
w as then, too, that Slobodan 
Milosevic began his move to seize 
power in Serbia, and to pull together 
the Serbian enclaves which pre­
viously had been semi-independent.
Milosevic's first step on this path was 
to take away Kosovo's autonomy by 
force. That ought to have been the 
first signal that something was 
am iss. This was followed by a 
protracted period of shadow-boxing. 
Croatia and Slovenia were seeking a 
new Yugoslavia conceived as a loose 
association of independent states; 
Serbia and Montenegro insisted on 
simply modernising the federation; 
while Bosnia and Macedonia were 
somewhere in the middle. Again, it
was clear that this situation was not 
tenable in the long-term. That was 
the second point at which the world 
community could have moved in 
and offered to help resolve the prob­
lem.
Even once the war had started, the 
world community could immedi­
ately have provided what they 
provided for the Kurds—that is, an 
air umbrella over the territory of 
former Yugoslavia to prevent Yugos­
lav air attacks. That would have had 
a tremendous effect on the war be­
cause the major advantage of the Ser­
bian forces isn't in tanks and heavy 
artillery, but in the air. Without that 
advantage the war would have been 
much more even, and probably 
would have been resolved much 
more quickly.
The world community also made the 
fatal mistake right at the beginning of 
the war of imposing an arms embar­
go on the territory of former Yugos­
lavia. This was intended to help the 
situation. In fact, it simply forced the 
rep ublics that wanted to leave 
Yugoslavia to fight with one hand 
tied behind their backs. They didn't 
have sufficient weaponry, and found 
it very difficult to get any, while the 
Serbs inherited one of the largest ar­
mies in Europe.
Thus far, its actions have been inef­
fective. However, there has now been 
a fundam ental and encouraging 
change in the world community's 
response to the conflict. As recently 
as December, when the Serbs were 
bombing the living daylights out of 
Dubrovnik, the world community's 
response was basically to throw its 
hands in the air in helplessness. Now, 
seven months later, they have moved 
decisively in the UN. Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia have been intro­
duced as full members, while Yugos­
lavia runs the risk of losing its 
position in that body.
The Security Council vote in favour 
of sanctions in June was particularly 
surprising in its decisiveness. Serbia, 
for one, was absolutely flabbergasted 
that the Russians supported the mo­
tion. The Russians, because of their 
historic links with the Serbs, were
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always anxious to give them one last 
chance. However, the morning after 
the R ussian  foreign  m inister, 
Kozyrev, had negotiated a ceasefire 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs 
launched their appalling attack on a 
bread queue in Sarajevo—an event 
w hich was relayed by satellite 
around the world. That made the 
Russian position look very foolish, 
and it prompted them finally to dis­
sociate themselves from the Serbs. 
That, in turn, facilitated the creation 
of the coalition which the Americans 
needed in order to impose sanctions.
The Russians and Americans now 
both support further action by the 
UN. Many people seem to think that 
UN intervention has to follow the 
model of Desert Storm. I would 
argue that, on the contrary, the ap­
propriate model is rather the first 
half of Desert Storm—Desert Shield. 
It's totally unrealistic, especially in 
an American election year, to expect 
the world community to gather a 
sizeable force of ground troops-to 
restore order in Yugoslavia. Even if 
they were able to do so, they would 
very quickly find themselves in a 
quagmire. However, a great deal can 
be done without the need for a large 
number of UN troops.
Among the possible options are a 
total blockade of Montenegrin ports 
to block transport up and down the 
Danube; the closure of oil pipelines 
into Serbia; a complete ban on all air 
activity over the territory of Serbia 
and Montenegro; and, if necessary, 
selective military bombardment of 
strategic targets in Serbia itself. In 
Bosnia it may be necessary to take 
control of the airport and the area 
around Sarajevo. None of this would 
be easy, but the point is that there is 
a great deal the world community 
can do to help the people of Sarajevo 
short of direct military intervention.
Regardless of the precise measures 
imposed, the dilemma of Yugoslavia 
will have to end where it began. 
Milosevic came to power on the 
streets; ultimately, I believe, he will 
lose power there, too. If he does, it
will be as a result of his inability to 
keep control in Kosovo, and to 
stabilise the economy. Here the UN 
sanctions are important; if they are 
fully imposed they will have a 
catastrophic effect on the Serbian 
economy. There's no doubt that a 
great m any Serbs never really 
wanted the war. It's no accident that 
tens of thousands of young men who 
refused to obey mobilisation call-ups 
are now living outside Serbia. This 
could rebound on Milosevic.
U nfortunately , Serbian public 
opinion is very poorly informed be­
cause of the ruthless propaganda 
machine which aims to manipulate 
Serbian  popular opinion. The 
Croatian media, it should be said, is 
not much better in this regard, 
though it does allow a slightly wider 
range of views than in Serbia. This 
lack of information helps to explain 
why the bulk of the Serbian public is 
confused. For a year and a half they 
have been told that they are fighting 
a war against fascism. Then, sudden­
ly, their political leadership and their 
media commentators have to inform 
them that by 13 votes to nil, the rest 
of the world—including Serbia's 
great ally Russia—has voted to im­
pose the most draconian UN sanc­
tions on any state since World War 
Two.
M losevic's overwhelming control of 
the media also makes it difficult to be 
certain how much of the ethnic hos­
tility evident in Serbia is a genuine 
legacy of old hatreds, and how much 
has been manufactured in recent 
tim es. There has been horrible 
savagery in this territory for cen­
turies, and a lot of old scores have 
never been settled. The Nazi-control- 
led Croatian Ustasha regime in­
flicted horrible suffering on Serbs, 
Gypsies and in World War Two and 
Serbian Chetniks and Nazi quislings 
did their fair share of killing as well. 
And there was another wave of kill­
ings in the period immediately after 
the w ar when the com m unists 
engaged in a fairly thorough cleans­
ing operation against those they 
defined as Croat fascists.
So there is a considerable body of 
hatred based in history. But then 
came 50 years of Titoism. And it is 
fair to say that over that period, while 
the hatreds continued under the sur­
face, there was a remarkable change 
in the relationships between the 
various ethnic communities. In Bos­
nia and Croatia there was a high de­
gree of intermarriage, and great 
efforts were made to break down his­
torical ethnic tensions.
It was perhaps inevitable that both 
Milosevic and Croatian president 
Tudjman would use the ghosts of the 
past to help them obtain and keep 
power. The more important question 
is, if these old hatreds were so fierce, 
how were they kept under the sur­
face for so long? Was it simply the 
omnipresence of Tito's secret police 
and the army, or had some genuine 
conciliation been made by all of the 
peoples of former Yugoslavia? While 
many people like to believe that their 
own feuds are very special, in reality 
ethnic rivalry is usually secondary in 
international relations. The English 
and the French have hated one 
another for centuries yet Britain and 
France coexist peacefully in the EC. 
The French and the Germans have 
fought countless wars, yet they have 
now formed a joint army. Historic 
hatreds can be put aside. Indeed, I 
would argue that in the former 
Yugoslavia, to a large degree they 
had been put aside.
So there is no inevitability about the 
continuation of ethnic violence and 
hatred in the old Yugoslavia. How­
ever, I fear that even if some sort of 
peace is imposed, low-level conflict 
at least will continue for a long time. 
Too many people in the old Yugos­
lavia now have the smell of gunpow­
der in their nostrils, and too many 
people have benefited from the 
war—the black marketeers, the local 
warlords and the looters on all sides.
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